Comments

Comm. NT: 69.
Upasamānussatikathāvaṇṇanā

“In such passages as ‘Dhammas that are concepts’ (Dhs p. 1, §1308) even a non- entity (abhāva) is thus called a ‘dhamma’ since it is borne (dhārīyati) and affirmed (avadhārīyati) by knowledge. That kind of dhamma is excluded by his saying, ‘Dhammas [means] individual essences.’
The act of becoming (bhavana), which constitutes existing- ness (vijjamānatā) in the ultimate sense, is essence (bhāva); it is with essence (saha bhāvena), thus it is an individual essence (sabhāva); the meaning is that it is possible (labbhamānarūpa) in the true sense, in the ultimate sense.
For these are called ‘dhammas (bearers)’ because they bear (dhāraṇa) their own individual essences (sabhāva), and they are called ‘individual essences’ in the sense already explained”

In the Piṭakas the word sabhāva seems to appear only once (Paṭis II 178). It next appears in the Netti (p.79), the Milindapañhā (pp. 90, 164, 212, 360). It is extensively used for exegetical purposes in the Visuddhimagga and main commentaries and likewise in the subcommentaries. As has just been shown, it is narrower than dhamma (see also Ch. XXIII. n. 18). It often roughly corresponds to dhātu (element—see e.g. Dhs-a 263) and to lakkhaṇa (characteristic—see below), but less nearly to the vaguer and (in Pali) untechnical pakati (nature), or to rasa (function—see I.21). The Atthasālinī observes: “It is the individual essence, or the generality, of such and such dhammas that is called their characteristic” (Dhs-a 63); on which the Mūla Þīkā comments: “The individual essence consisting in, say, hardness as that of earth, or touching as that of contact, is not common to all dhammas. The generality is the individual essence common to all consisting in impermanence, etc.; also in this context (i.e. Dhs §1) the characteristic of being profitable may be regarded as general because it is the individual essence common to all that is profitable; or alternatively it is their individual essence because it is not common to the unprofitable and indeterminate [kinds of consciousness]” (Dhs- a 63). The individual essence of any formed dhamma is manifested in the three instants of its existence (atthitā, vijjamānatā), namely, arising, presence (= aging) and dissolution.

Comm. NT: It comes from nowhere and goes nowhere (XV.15) and is borne by the mind. Dhammas without individual essence (asabhāvadhamma) include the attainment of cessation (see Ch. XXIII, n. 18) and some concepts. Space and time belong to the last-mentioned. Of space (ākāsa) the Majjhima Nikāya ṭīkā says: “Space, which is quite devoid of individual essence, is called empty” (commenting on MN 106), while of time (kāla) the Mūla ṭīkā says: “Though time is determined by the kind of consciousness [e.g. as specified in the first paragraph of the Dhammasaṅgaṇī] and is non-existent (avijjamāna) as to individual essence, yet as the non-entity (abhāva) before and after the moment in which those [conascent and co-present] dhammas occur, it is called the ‘container (adhikaraṇa)’; it is perceived (symbolized) only as the state of a receptacle (ādhāra-bhāva) (Dhs-a 62). Of Nibbāna (for which see XVI.46ff.), which has its own individual essence, the Mūla ṭīkā says “Nibbāna is not like other dhammas; because of its extreme profundity it cannot be made an object of consciousness (ālambituṃ) by one who has not realized it. That is why it has to be realized by change-of-lineage. It has profundity surpassing any individual essence belonging to the three periods of time” (Vibh-a 38).

Comm. NT: Sabhāva has not the extreme vagueness of its parent bhāva, which can mean anything between “essence” (see e.g. Dhs-a 61) and “-ness” (e.g. natthibhāva = non-existingness - X.35). This may be remembered when sabhāva is defined as above thus: “It is with essence (sahabhāvena), thus it is individual essence (sabhāva)” (Vism-mhṭ 282), and when it is defined again thus: “A dhamma’s own essence or its existing essence (sako vā bhāvo samāno vā bhāvo) is its individual essence (sabhāva)” (Vism-mhṭ 433). Sabhāva can also be the basis of a wrong view, if regarded as the sole efficient cause or condition of any formed thing (Ch. XVI, n.23). The Sanskrit equivalent, svabhāva, had a great vogue and checkered history in philosophical discussions on the Indian mainland.
This (unlike the word, dhamma, which has many “referents”) is an instance in which it is of first importance to stick to one rendering. The word is a purely exegetical one; consequently vagueness is undesirable. “Individual essence” has been chosen principally on etymological grounds, and the word “essence” (an admittedly slippery customer) must be understood from the contexts in which it is used and not prejudged. Strictly it refers here to the triple moment of arising etc., of formed dhammas that can have such “existence” in their own right and be experienced as such; and it refers to the realizability of Nibbāna. We are here in the somewhat magical territory of ontology, a subject that is at present undergoing one of its periodical upheavals in Europe, this time in the hands of the existentialists. Consequently it is important to approach the subject with an open mind.

пали	Dhammāti sabhāvā.
Nyanamoli thera	Dhammas [means] individual essences.69